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Abstract
Strategic games are considered where each player's total utility is the sum of local utilities
obtained from the use of certain \facilities." All players using a facility obtain the same utility
therefrom, which may depend on the identities of users and on their behavior. If a regularity
condition is satised by every facility, then the game admits an exact potential; both congestion
games and games with structured utilities are included in the class and satisfy that condition. Under
additional assumptions the potential attains its maximum, which is a Nash equilibrium of the game.
MSC2010 Classication: 91A10; Journal of Economic Literature Classication: C 72.
Key words: Potential game; Congestion game; Game with structured utilities; Game of social
interactions; Additive aggregation
1 Introduction
When Monderer and Shapley (1996) introduced the notion of a potential game, the main example they
had in mind were Rosenthal's (1973) congestion games. Their Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 showed that a
nite game admits an exact potential if and only if it can be represented as a congestion game (the
suciency part was implicit in Rosenthal's reasoning). An alternative, more transparent proof was
given in Voorneveld et al. (1999, Theorem 3.3).
Kukushkin (2007) introduced games with structured utilities, in a sense, \dual" to congestion games;
the players there do not choose which facilities to use, only how to use facilities from a xed list. The
idea of such a structure of utility functions can be traced back to Germeier and Vatel' (1974), although
the local utilities in that paper were aggregated with the minimum function. Theorem 5 from Kukushkin
(2007) showed that a strategic game admits an exact potential if and only if it can be represented as
a game with structured utilities.
Thus, two dierent classes of potential games were considered in Kukushkin (2007); one universal
for nite potential games, the other for all of them. The possibility to combine both constructions was
not discussed, actually, was overlooked altogether.
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Le Breton and Weber (2011) described a class of strategic games which possess Nash equilibria
because they admit an exact potential which, in its turn, attains its maximum. There was some
similarity with both constructions, and with their potentials as well; however, those games need not
belong to either class.
The motivation for this paper was purely technical, one could say, aesthetical. Our main objective
is to gure out how those two constructions generating potential games could be combined into a single,
unied construction. We dene a general class of strategic games where the players are able to choose
both which facilities to use and how to use them. Then we formulate conditions ensuring that such a
game admits an exact potential; naturally, they are satised for both congestion games and games with
structured utilities, as well as games of Le Breton and Weber. Since those conditions are formulated
independently for every facility, a necessity result becomes obtainable: if a facility does not satisfy
them, adding it to a potential game may destroy that property.
Our basic construction is described in the following section. In Section 3, the key denitions of a
regular facility and a regular game are given; Theorem 1 asserts the presence of an exact potential in
every regular game. Theorem 2 in Section 4 shows kind of necessity of regularity for this property.
In Section 5, the question of when the potential attains its maximum is addressed; since the strategy
sets in our games may be innite, this question is not trivial. We formulate a list of assumptions ensuring
the upper semiconinuity of the potential, and hence the existence of a Nash equilibrium (Theorem 3).
The proof of the theorem is in Section 6.
Section 7 demonstrates that the Le Breton{Weber construction is, indeed, a particular case of ours.
In Section 8, we show that every game from the class considered by Harks et al. (2011) can be naturally
represented as one from our class. Section 9 summarizes the message of the paper.
2 Basic denitions
A strategic game   is dened by a nite set N of players, and, for each i 2 N , a set Xi of strategies and
a real-valued utility function ui on the set XN :=
Q
i2N Xi of strategy proles. We denote N := 2N nf;g
and XI :=
Q
i2I Xi for each I 2 N . Given i; j 2 N , we use notation X i instead of XNnfig and X ij
instead of XNnfi;jg.
A function P : XN ! R is an exact potential of   (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) if
ui(yN )  ui(xN ) = P (yN )  P (xN ) (1)
whenever i 2 N , yN ; xN 2 XN , and y i = x i. If x0N 2 XN maximizes P over XN , then, obviously,
x0N is a Nash equilibrium.
A game with (additive) common local utilities (a CLU game) may have an arbitrary nite set N
of players and arbitrary sets of strategies Xi (i 2 N), whereas the utilities are dened by the following
construction. First of all, there is a set A of facilities; we denote B the set of all (nonempty) nite
subsets of A. For each i 2 N , there is a mapping Bi : Xi ! B describing what facilities player i
2
uses having chosen xi. Every strategy prole xN determines local utilities at all facilities  2 A; each
player's total utility is the sum of local utilities over chosen facilities. The exact denitions need plenty
of notations.
For every  2 A, we denote I  := fi 2 N j 8xi 2 Xi [ 2 Bi(xi)]g and I+ := fi 2 N j 9xi 2
Xi [ 2 Bi(xi)]g; without restricting generality, we may assume I+ 6= ;. For each i 2 I+ , we denote
Xi := fxi 2 Xi j  2 Bi(xi)g; if i 2 I  , then Xi = Xi. Then we set I := fI 2 N j I   I  I+ g
and  := fhI; xIi j I 2 I & xI 2 XI g. The local utility function at  2 A is ' :  ! R. For every
 2 A and xN 2 XN , we denote I(; xN ) := fi 2 N j  2 Bi(xi)g; obviously, I   I(; xN )  I+ .
The total utility function of each player i is
ui(xN ) :=
X
2Bi(xi)
'(I(; xN ); xI(;xN )): (2)
3 Regularity
We call a facility  2 A regular if these two conditions are satised:
1) whenever i =2 J  N , I+ 6= J [ fig 2 I, xi; yi 2 Xi , and xJ 2 XJ , there holds
'(J [ fig; (xJ ; xi)) = '(J [ fig; (xJ ; yi)); (3a)
2) whenever J  N and i; j 2 N n J are such that i 6= j, J [ fig 2 I 3 J [ fjg, and xJ[fi;jg 2
XJ[fi;jg, there holds
'(J [ fig; xJ[fig) = '(J [ fjg; xJ[fjg) (3b)
(J = ; is allowed in both conditions, in which case the term xJ should be just ignored).
For every  2 A, we denote n () := minI2I #I = maxf1;#I  g.
Proposition 1. A facility  2 A is regular if and only if there is a real-valued function  () dened
for integer m between n () and #I+   1 such that
'(I; xI) =  (#I) (4)
whenever I 2 I, I 6= I+ , and xI 2 XI .
In other words: whenever a regular facility  is not used by all potential users, neither the identities
of the users, nor their strategies matter, only the number of users.
Proof. The implication \if" is obvious. Let  2 A be a regular facility and m be an integer between
n () and #I+  1. First of all, the existence of such m implies that #I+ > n (). Further, whenever
I 2 I, I 6= I+ , and xI ; yI 2 XI , we can, picking, one by one, i 2 I and replacing xi with yi, obtain,
by (3a), that '(I; xI) = '(I; yI), i.e., the choice of strategies does not matter indeed.
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Let us show the irrelevance of the identities of users. If I  6= ; and m = #I  , we dene  (m) :=
'(I
 
 ; xI  ), which does not depend on xI  2 XI  by the argument of the preceding paragraph. There
is no other I 2 I with the same #I. If I  = ;, we set  (1) := '(fig; xi), which does not depend on
i 2 I+ by (3b) with J = ;, or on xi 2 Xi by the argument of the preceding paragraph again.
Finally, supposing that I; J 2 I, n () < #I = #J < #I+ , xI 2 XI and yJ 2 XJ , we
have to prove that '(I; xI) = '(J; yJ). Obviously, there is a one-to-one correspondence between
J n I := fj1; : : : ; jkg and I n J := fi1; : : : ; ikg. Consecutively applying (3b), we obtain:
'(I; xI) = '((I \ J) [ fj1; i2; : : : ; ikg; (x(I\J)[fi2;:::;ikg; yj1)) =
'((I \ J) [ fj1; j2; i3; : : : ; ikg; (x(I\J)[fi3;:::;ikg; yfj1;j2g)) =    = '(J; yJ):
Now we can set  (m) := '(I; xI) for an arbitrary I 2 I with #I = m and an arbitrary xI 2 XI ,
and have (4) satised.
We call a CLU game regular if so is every facility. It is instructive to check that both congestion
games and games with structured utilities are regular. In the rst case, (4) holds for all I 2 I, even
for I = I+ ; in the second case, conversely, I
 
 = I
+
 for each facility  and hence (4) is not required at
all.
Theorem 1. Every regular CLU game admits an exact potential.
Proof. Given xN 2 XN , we denote A(xN ) := f 2 A j I(; xN ) 6= ;g and A+(xN ) := f 2 A j
#I(; xN ) > n
 ()g [ A(xN )]; since N and each Bi(xi) are nite, A(xN ) is nite too. Now we dene
our potential function in this way:
P (xN ) :=
X
2A(xN )
'(I(; xN ); xI(;xN )) +
X
2A+(xN )
#I(;xN ) 1X
m=n ()
 (m): (5)
Given i 2 N and x i 2 X i, we denote I i(; x i) := fj 2 N nfig j  2 Bj(xj)g, A i(x i) := f 2
A j I i(; x i) 6= ;g and A+ i(x i) := f 2 A j #I i(; x i) > n ()g [ A i(x i)]. Then we dene
these auxiliary functions Q i : X i ! R (i 2 N):
Q i(x i) :=
X
2A i(x i)
'(I i(; x i); xI i(;x i)) +
X
2A+ i(xN )
#I i(;x i) 1X
m=n ()
 (m): (6)
Once we show that
P (xN ) = ui(xN ) +Q i(x i) (7)
for all i 2 N and xN 2 XN , Theorem 2.1 of Voorneveld et al. (1999) will imply that P is an exact
potential.
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Whenever  =2 Bi(xi), we have I i(; x i) = I(; xN ); therefore, this  brings to Q i(x i) the
same contribution as to P (xN ), while no contribution at all to ui(xN ). For every  2 Bi(xi), we
have I i(; x i) = I(; xN ) n fig and hence #I i(; x i) = #I(; xN )   1. If I(; xN ) = fig, then
this  brings to ui(xN ) the same contribution, '(fig; xi), as to P (xN ), while no contribution at all
to Q i(x i). If I(; xN ) = fi; jg, then this  contributes '(fi; jg; (xi; xj)) to ui(xN ), contributes
'(fjg; xj) to Q i(x i), and contributes '(fi; jg; (xi; xj)) +  (1) to P (xN ). Since '(fjg; xj) =
 (1) by Proposition 1, total contributions coincide again. Finally, if #I(; xN ) > 2, we argue virtually
in the same way as in the previous case of #I(; xN ) = 2. Equality (7) being satised, Theorem 1 is
proven.
4 Necessity of regularity
Let a nite set N of players be xed. An autonomous facility  is dened by two subsets I   I+ 2 N
[I  may be empty], a set Xi of relevant strategies for each i 2 I+ , and a local utility function
' : 
 ! R, where I := fI 2 N j I   I  I+ g and  := fhI; xI i j I 2 I & xI 2 XI g, exactly as
in Section 2. We call an autonomous facility  regular if it satises the same conditions (3).
Let  be an autonomous facility, and let   be a CLU game with the same set N , a nite set A such
that  =2 A, and Xi\Xi = ; for each i 2 N . An extension of   with  is a strategic game   satisfying
these conditions: N = N ; A = A [ fg; for each i 2 N , Xi = Xi [ Xi if i 2 I+ and Xi := Xi
otherwise, Bi (xi) = Bi(xi) for each xi 2 Xi, and, for each xi 2 Xi , there is i(xi ) 2 Xi such that
Bi (x

i ) = fg[Bi(i(xi )); whenever I 2 I and xI 2 XI , there holds '(I; xI ) = '(I; xI ); whenever
 2 A, I 2 I , xI 2 XI , and J = fi 2 I j xi 2 Xi g, there holds '(I; xI) = '(I; (xInJ ; J(xJ))).
Theorem 2. For every autonomous facility  the following statements are equivalent:
1.  is regular.
2. Whenever   is an extension with  of a regular CLU game  ,   admits an exact potential.
3. Whenever   is an extension with  of a congestion game  ,   admits an exact potential.
4. Whenever   is an extension with  of a game with structured utilities  ,   admits an exact
potential.
Proof. The implication Statement 1 ) Statement 2 immediately follows from Theorem 1; the implica-
tions Statement 2 ) Statement 3 and Statement 2 ) Statement 4 are trivial. We only have to show
the implications Statement 3) Statement 1 and Statement 4) Statement 1; so let Statement 3 hold.
Claim 2.1. Let i; j 2 I+ , i =2 I 2 I, j 2 I, xI 2 XI and yj 2 Xj . Then '(I; xI ) =
'(I; (x

Infjg; y

j )).
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Proof of Claim 2.1. Let us consider a congestion game   with the same set N of players, a singleton
set of facilities A := fg, and a singleton set of strategies Xh := fxhg with Bh(xh) := fg for each
h 2 N , and an arbitrary constant (in lieu of a function) '(N; xN ) =  (#N). We dene an extension
  of   with  by: N := N ; A := f; g; Xh := fxhg for each h 2 N n I+ ; Xh := fxhg[Xh for each
h 2 I+ ; Bh(xh) = fg; Bh(xh) = A for each xh 2 Xh ; '(J; xJ ) = '(J; xJ ) for every J 2 I and
xJ 2 XJ ; '(N; xN ) = '(N; xN ).
Since we assumed Statement 3 to hold,   admits an exact potential; hence so does every subgame.
As was noted by Monderer and Shapley (1996, Theorem 2.8), it is enough to consider 22 subgames. We
leave players i and j with two strategies each: fxi ; xi g and fxj ; yj g, respectively, xing strategies for all
other players: xh for h 2 I and xh for h =2 I. Introducing auxiliary notations, u := '(N;xN ), vx :=
'(I [ fig; xI[fig), vy := '(I [ fig; (xI[fignfjg; yj )), ux := '(I; xI ), and uy := '(I; (xInfjg; yj )),
we obtain the following matrix of the resulting subgame:
xj y

j
xi
xi
hvx + u ; vx + ui hvy + u ; vy + ui
hu ; ux + ui hu ; uy + ui

:
Straightforward calculations show that P (xi ; y

j ; x ij)   P (xi ; xj ; x ij) = [P (xi ; xj ; x ij)  
P (xi ; x

j ; x ij)] + [P (x

i ; y

j ; x ij)  P (xi ; xj ; x ij)] + [P (xi ; yj ; x ij)  P (xi ; yj ; x ij)] = vx + (vy  
vx )  vy = 0. Therefore, '(I; xI ) = uj(xi ; yj ; x ij) = uj(xi ; xj ; x ij) = '(I; (xInfjg; yj )). In other
words, (3a) is established.
Claim 2.2. Let i; j 2 I 2 I, I   Infi; jg, and xI 2 XI . Then '(Infig; xInfig) = '(Infjg; xInfjg).
Proof of Claim 2.2. We consider the same congestion game   used in the proof of Claim 2.1 and the
same extension   of   with . This time, we consider a 2 2 subgame where players i and j have two
strategies each: fxi ; xi g and fxj ; xj g, respectively, while the strategies of all other players are xed:
xh for h 2 I and xh for h =2 I.
Again, this subgame must admit an exact potential. Introducing auxiliary notations, u :=
'(N; x

N ), u
 := '(I; x

I ), v

i := '(I n fig; xInfig) and vj := '(I n fjg; xInfjg), we obtain the
following matrix:
xj x

j
xi
xi
hu + u; u + ui hvj + u; ui
hu ; vi + ui hu ; ui

:
Now we have 0 = [P (xi ; x

j ; x ij)   P (xi ; xj ; x ij)] + [P (xi ; xj ; x ij)   P (xi ; xj ; x ij)] +
[P (xi ; x

j ; x ij) P (xi ; xj ; x ij)] + [P (xi ; xj ; x ij) P (xi ; xj ; x ij)] = u  u   vj + vi = vi   vj .
Therefore, '(I n fig; xInfig) = vi = vj = '(I n fjg; xInfjg). In other words, (3b) is established.
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The proof of the implication Statement 4 ) Statement 1 is now straightforward: the congestion
game   used in the proofs of Claims 2.2 and 2.1 can as well be perceived as a game with structured
utilities. Theorem 2 is proven.
Theorem 2 takes it for granted that the players add up their local utilities. Actually, the necessity
(in a sense) of addition was showed in Kukushkin (2007): If the players may aggregate local utilities
with arbitrary (continuous and strictly increasing) functions, then the existence of an exact potential
is ensured regardless of other characteristics of the game only if the players sum up local utilities; that
statement remains valid when attention is restricted to congestion games (Theorem 2 of Kukushkin,
2007), or to games with structured utilities (Theorem 4).
Strictly speaking, those theorems do not exclude the possibility that the aggregation of local utilities
with some other, non-strictly increasing functions might also ensure the existence of an exact potential,
but there is no reason to expect anything interesting here. On the other hand, the minimum aggre-
gation, as envisaged by Germeier and Vatel' (1974), ensures the acyclicity of coalitional improvements
and hence the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium (Harks et al., 2013; Kukushkin, 2014).
5 The existence of Nash equilibrium
To ensure that the potential P attains a maximum, some additional assumptions are needed. The
simplest approach would be to have P upper semicontinuous and XN compact. A certain degree of
subtlety is required, however, as was shown by Le Breton and Weber (2011) even in a particular case.
Assumption 1. The set of facilities A and each strategy set Xi are metric spaces; each mapping
Bi is continuous in the Hausdor metric on the target; for every  2 A and I 2 I, the function
'(I; ) : XI ! R is upper semicontinuous.
Henceforth, we assume each set XI (I 2 N ) to be endowed with the maximum metrics. For each
i 2 N and m 2 N, we denote Xmi := fxi 2 Xi j #Bi(xi) = mg.
Assumption 2. For each i 2 N and m 2 N, either Xmi = ; or Xmi is a compact subset of Xi.
Assumption 3. For each i 2 N , Xmi 6= ; only for a nite number of m 2 N.
Assumptions 1 { 3 have technical implications useful in the following.
Lemma 1. Let i 2 N , xki 2 Xi for all k 2 N, and xki ! x!i 2 Xi; let open neighborhoods O of  2
Bi(x
!
i ) be such that O \O = ; whenever  6= . Then #Bi(xki ) = #Bi(x!i ) and #(Bi(xki )\O) = 1
for all  2 Bi(x!i ) and all k 2 N large enough.
Proof. By Assumption 3, there is a nite number of possible values of #Bi(x
k
i ); therefore, we must
have xki 2 Xmi for some m 2 N, m 6= 0, and an innite number of k 2 N. Since Xmi is compact by
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Assumption 2, and hence closed in Xi, we have x
!
i 2 Xmi too. It follows immediately that such an m
must be unique, i.e., xki 2 Xmi for all k 2 N large enough.
By Assumption 1, we have Bi(x
k
i )! Bi(x!i ). Therefore, for each k 2 N large enough and for each
 2 Bi(x!i ), there is k 2 Bi(xki ) \O. Since O \O = ; whenever  6= , and #Bi(xki ) = #Bi(x!i ),
we must have #(Bi(x
k
i ) \O) = 1 indeed.
For every  2 A, we denote
I :=

i 2 I+ j 9O

(O is an open subset of A) &  2 O & 8 2 O [i 2 I+ )  = ]
	
; (8)
loosely speaking, I is the set of players in whose strategy sets  is topologically isolated.
Lemma 2. For every  2 A, there holds I   I.
Proof. Supposing the contrary, let i 2 I  n I. By the negation of (8), there is a sequence k ! 
and a sequence xki 2 Xi such that k 2 Bi(xki ) and k 6=  for each k 2 N. Since Xi is compact by
Assumptions 2 and 3, we may assume that xki ! x!i 2 Xi. Since Bi(x!i ) is nite, there is an open
neighborhood O of each  2 Bi(x!i ) such that O \ O = ; whenever  6=  2 Bi(x!i ). Moreover, we
may assume that k 2 O for each k 2 N.
Now we have k 2 Bi(xki ) by the choice of k and  2 Bi(xki ) since i 2 I  . Since ; k 2 O, we
have #(Bi(x
k
i ) \O)  2, which contradicts Lemma 1.
Our nal assumption combines some sorts of upper semicontinuity (of ' \in ") and monotonicity
(of ' \in I").
Assumption 4. For every  2 A, I 2 I, and " > 0, there is  > 0 such that:
'(I; xI) > '(J; yJ)  " (9)
whenever  2 A n fg, J 2 I, xI 2 XI , yJ 2 XJ , J  I n I, and the distances between  and  in
A as well as between xJ and yJ in XJ are less than .
If A is nite as, e.g., in a game with structured utilities or in a congestion game, then Assumption 4
holds vacuously since I = I+ and hence no J 2 N could satisfy the conditions.
Theorem 3. Every regular CLU game satisfying Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4 possesses a (pure strategy)
Nash equilibrium.
The proof is deferred to Section 6.
It is impossible to argue that the assumptions imposed in Theorem 3 are necessary in a proper
sense. After all, neither upper semicontinuity, nor compactness are necessary for a function to attain
its maximum. Nonetheless, dropping any one of them makes the theorem wrong. There is no need to
discuss Assumption 1, but for the three others, appropriate counterexamples follow. In Examples 1
and 2, even one-player games suce.
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Example 1. Let us consider a \congestion game with an innite set of facilities," where N := f1g,
A := [0; 1], X1 := ff0gg[ff1=2m; 1=2m+1ggm2N, B1(x1) := fx1g for every x1 2 X1, and  (1) := 1 
for every  2 [0; 1]. All assumptions of Theorem 3 except Assumption 2 are satised, X1 is compact
(in the Hausdor metrics), but X21 is not. And there is no Nash equilibrium, i.e., maximum of u1:
supx12X21 u1(x1) = 2, whereas u1(x1) < 2 for every x1 2 X1.
Example 2. Let us consider a \congestion game with an innite set of facilities," where N := f1g,
A := [0; 1], X1 := ff0gg [ ff1=2m   k=[(m+ 1)2m+1]gk=0;:::;mgm2N, B1(x1) := fx1g for every x1 2 X1,
and  (1) := 1    for every  2 [0; 1]. All assumptions of Theorem 3 except Assumption 3 are
satised, X1 is compact, as well as each X
m
1 (m 2 N), which is actually a singleton. And again, there
is no Nash equilibrium, i.e., maximum of u1, since supx12X1 u1(x1) = +1.
Example 3. Let us consider a \congestion game with an innite set of facilities," where N := f1; 2g,
A := X1 := X2 := [0; 1], Bi(xi) := fxig for every xi 2 Xi,  (2) := 1    and  (1) := 2    for
every  2 [0; 1]. All assumptions of Theorem 3 except Assumption 4 are satised, but there is no Nash
equilibrium. Let (x1; x2) 2 XN and i 2 N . If xi 6= 0, then player i is better o slightly decreasing
xi. On the other hand, (f0g; f0g) is not an equilibrium either, because each player will be better o
choosing any xi 2]0; 1[.
6 Proof of Theorem 3
As was hinted at the start of Section 5, our strategy is to show that P dened by (5) is upper
semicontinuous on a compact XN . Then any strategy prole which maximizes P will be a Nash
equilibrium.
The compactness of XN immediately follows from Assumptions 2 and 3. Let x
k
N ! x!N 2 XN ; we
have to show that
P (x!N )  lim sup
k!1
P (xkN ):
Since A(x!N ) is nite, there is an open neighborhood O of each  2 A(x!N ) such that O \O = ;
whenever  6=  2 A(x!N ). Moreover, those neighborhoods can be picked in such a way that each
O is included in the neighborhood O from (8) for each i 2 I. Now Lemma 1 applies; therefore,
we may, without restricting generality, assume that Bi(x
k
i ) \ O = fki g for each  2 A(x!N ), i 2
I(; x!N ), and k 2 N [we should have written ki (), but ki related to dierent 's will never be
considered simultaneously]. Note that ki !  for each i 2 N . Since there is a nite number of
possible values of I(ki ; x
k
N ), we may, without restricting generality, assume that, given i 2 I(; x!N ),
the set I(ki ; x
k
N ) is the same for all k. Similarly, we may assume that I(; x
!
N ) is partitioned into
I(; x!N ) := fi 2 I(; x!N ) j 8k 2 N [ki = ]g [= fi 2 I(; x!N ) j 8k 2 N [ 2 Bi(xki )]g] and ~I(; x!N ) :=
fi 2 I(; x!N ) j 8k 2 N [ki 6= ]g [= fi 2 I(; x!N ) j 8k 2 N [ =2 Bi(xki )]g]. By denition (8), we have
~I(; x!N )  I(; x!N ) n I(; x!N ).
Arguing quite similarly to the proof of Lemma 2, we may assume that I 
ki
= ; whenever ki 6= .
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Now we are ready to analyze and compare the right-hand side of (5) for xkN ,
X
2A(xkN )
'(I(; x
k
N ); x
k
I(;xkN )
) +
X
2A+(xkN )
#I(;xkN ) 1X
m=n ()
 (m); (10a)
and for x!N , X
2A(x!N )
'(I(; x
!
N ); xI(;x!N )) +
X
2A+(x!N )
#I(;x!N ) 1X
m=n ()
 (m): (10b)
If ~I(; x!N ) = ; and hence I(; x!N ) = I(; xkN ) =: I for each k, then this  contributes
'(I; x
k
I ) +
h #I 1X
m=n ()
 (m)
i
to (10a) [the term in square brackets disappears if #I = n ()] and
'(I; x
!
I ) +
h #I 1X
m=n ()
 (m)
i
to (10b); since '(I; ) is upper semicontinuous by Assumption 1, there is no problem with this .
If ~I(; x!N ) 6= ;, the analysis is more complicated. For brevity, we denote I := I(; x!N ), I :=
I(; x!N ),
~I := ~I(; x!N ), and I(i) := I(
k
i ; x
k
N ) for each i 2 ~I; as was noted above, I(i) does not depend
on k. Now the contribution of this  to (10a) is
'(I; x
k
I ) +
h #I 1X
m=n ()
 (m)
i
+
X
i2~I
1
#I(i)
n
'ki
(I(i); xkI(i)) +
h#I(i) 1X
m=1
 ki
(m)
io
: (11a)
[The terms in square brackets disappear if, respectively, #I = n () or #I(i) = 1; we divide the
rightmost sum in (11a) by #I(i) to compensate for multiple counting of the same terms.]
The contribution of the same  to (10b) is
'(I; x
!
I ) +
h #I 1X
m=n ()
 (m) +
#I 1X
#I
 (m)
i
: (11b)
Taking into account Assumption 4 and the fact that ~I(; x!N )  I(; x!N ) n I(; x!N ), we see that
the upper limit of (11a) cannot be greater than (11b).
The upper semicontinuity of P is proven, and so is the theorem.
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7 Le Breton{Weber construction
To show that the games considered by Le Breton and Weber (2011) are regular CLU games, we
reproduce their construction, in somewhat streamlined notations. All strategy sets Xi are compact
subsets of a Euclidean space RT ; X =
S
i2N Xi. Given a strategy prole xN 2 XN and x 2 X, we
denote n(x; xN ) the number of players with xi = x. The payo Ui(xN ) of player i is the sum of
three terms (\taste component," \local social interaction component," and \global social interaction
component"):
Ui(xN ) = Vi(xi) +
X
j2Nnfig
W ji (xi; xj) +H(xi; n(xi; xN )): (12)
Three substantial assumptions are made: (1) each function Vi, W
j
i , and H(;m) (m 2 N) is upper
semi-continuous; (2) W ji (xi; xj) = W
i
j (xj ; xi) for every i; j 2 N , every xi 2 Xi and every xj 2 Xj ; (3)
H(x; ) is increasing for all x 2 X. Under those assumptions, Le Breton and Weber (2011) showed that
the following function is an upper semi-continuous exact potential:
	(xN ) =
X
i2N
Vi(xi) + 1=2
X
i2N
X
j2Nnfig
W ji (xi; xj) +
X
x2X : n(x;xN )>0
n(x;xN )X
m=1
H(x;m): (13)
Denoting N2 the set of all unordered pairs in N , i.e., subsets of cardinality 2, we dene A :=
N [ N2 [ X; Bi(xi) := fig [ ffi; jggj2Nnfig [ fxig; 'i(xi) := Vi(xi); 'fi;jg(xi; xj) := W ji (xi; xj);
 x(m) := H(x;m). It is easy to check now that utility functions (2) coincide with utility functions
(12), while exact potential (5) coincides with potential (13). The assumptions of Le Breton and Weber
(2011) imply our Assumptions 1{4 (actually, the latter were developed as a generalization of the former).
8 Player-specic local utilities
Congestion games with player-specic local utilities are a natural generalization of Rosenthal's (1973)
model. Typically, one cannot expect the existence of an equilibrium, to say nothing of an exact poten-
tial, in such games, even though there are results on the existence of a Nash equilibrium (Milchtaich,
1996) or even a strong Nash one (Konishi, et al., 1997) in some particular cases. This big and important
topic is mostly left out here. The only objective of this section is to show that both classes of congestion
games with player-specic local utilities shown by Harks et al. (2011) to admit exact potentials can be
obtained from our construction.
We consider even a more general model, which simultaneously includes both \weighted congestion
games with facility-dependent demands" and \weighted congestion games with elastic demands" of
Harks et al. (2011). There is a nite set N of players and an arbitrary set A of facilities; we denote
X the set of x = hxi2A 2 RA such that B(x) := f 2 A j x 6= 0g is nite. For each player i 2 N ,
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there is a strategy set Xi  X and a function Fi : Xi ! R; for every  2 A, there is a constant c 2 R.
Given a strategy prole xN 2 XN , the local utility obtained by player i from a facility  is
'i (x

N ) := x

i 
X
j2N
c  xj : (14)
The total utility function is
ui(xN ) := Fi(xi) +
X
2B(xi)
'i (x

N ): (15)
We may say that the players belonging to the set I(; xN ) := fi 2 N j xi 6= 0 [  2 B(xi)]g
have chosen facility . Then we notice that 'i (x

N ) = 0 whenever i =2 I(; xN ); similarly, 'i (xN ) only
depends on xI(;xN ), so we could write '

i (x

I(;xN )
) in the left hand side of (14) and the right hand
side of (15). Now we see that (15) can be viewed as a generalization of (2) where dierent players may
extract dierent local utilities from the same facility.
As a straightforward example of such a game, assume that A is the set of edges of a network. A
strategy of each player is a ow through the network with given source and destination nodes, satisfying
Kirchho's law at each intermediate node. The cost of pushing a unit of ow through an edge  is
ane in the total load:  b   c
P
i2N x

i . The function Fi is the gain obtained from the ow minus
the costs incurred independently of the behavior of other players, i.e., plus
P
2A b  xi . Under this
interpretation, (15) is an adequate description of the payo to player i. The natural assumptions are
b; c  0 and xi  0 for all i and . Upper restrictions on xi can be added; moreover, there may be
arbitrary restrictions on xi as well, e.g., they may be all integer.
Imposing some superuous restrictions (e.g., A was nite throughout; the choice of a ow satisfying
Kirchho's law was excluded; etc.), Harks et al. (2011) showed that such a game admits an exact
potential. Therefore, it can be represented as a game with structured utilities (Kukushkin, 2007,
Theorem 5), or, if all strategy sets Xi are nite, as a congestion game (Monderer and Shapley, 1996,
Theorem 3.2). In either case, however, rather articial constructions may be needed.
Given a game   with utilities dened by (14) and (15), we dene, in a simple and natural way, a
regular CLU game   which is isomorphic to  . There are the same players with the same strategy sets,
N := N and Xi := Xi for each i 2 N . The set of facilities is modied: A := N [ (AN)[ (AN2),
where, as in Section 7, N2 is the set of all unordered pairs inN , i.e., subsets of cardinality 2. Given i 2 N
and xi 2 Xi, we dene Bi (xi) := fig [ ff(; i)g [ f(; fi; jg)gj2Nnfigg2B(xi); thus, I+i = I+(;i) = fig
and I+(;fi;jg) = fi; jg for all  2 A and i; j 2 N , i 6= j. The local utilities are dened in this way:
'i (fig; xi) := Fi(xi); '(;i)(fig; xi ) := xi  c  xi ; '(;fi;jg)(I; xI ) := c  xi  xj if I = fi; jg, while
'(;fi;jg)(I; x

I ) := 0 if I 6= fi; jg.
It is easy to check now that utility functions (2) coincide with utility functions (15). Moreover, the
regularity conditions (4) are obvious. Thus, the existence of an exact potential immediately follows
from Theorem 1.
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It is worthwhile to note that, if A is nite, we could set Bi (xi) := fig [ ff(; i)g [
f(; fi; jg)gj2Nnfigg2A for all i 2 N and xi 2 Xi, in which case   would be a game with struc-
tured utilities. For an innite A, such a representation is inadmissible without a revision of our basic
denitions.
If all strategy sets Xi are nite, then we have the existence of a Nash equilibrium as well. If A is
nite, then it will be enough to assume that each Xi is compact (the utility functions are continuous
anyway). Otherwise, we may assume that A is a metric space; then each Xi is also a metric space and
Assumption 1 holds. We have to impose Assumptions 2 and 3 as they are; as to Assumption 4, it holds
if Di  R+ for all i 2 N and  2 A, while b; c > 0 for all  2 A. In other words, it is natural in
this case to restrict attention to positive externalities (Le Breton and Weber, 2011, have already come
to the same conclusion).
Harks et al. (2011) also showed the necessity of the ane combinations in local utilities for the
guaranteed existence of a potential; it does not seem possible to derive the fact from our Theorem 2.
On the other hand, if we drop the idea that the costs should be the same for all users of a given facility,
then polylinear combinations with symmetric coecients would be acceptable as well. For instance,
consider local utility functions of the form
'i (x

N ) := x

i 
hX
j2N
cij  xj +
X
j;k2Nnfig; j 6=k
dijk  xj  xk
i
;
where coecients cij and d
ijk
 are invariant w.r.t. permutations of the indices from N for every  2 A.
Virtually the same argument as above shows that such a game is isomorphic to a regular CLU game.
One may doubt that such cost functions could adequately describe any real-world interrelationships,
but an interesting point is that they also emerge in the study of Cournot ta^tonnement in aggregative
games with monotone best responses (Kukushkin, 2005).
9 Conclusion
Let us summarize our main ndings. It is, in principle, possible to allow the players in a congestion
game to choose some additional parameters beside the facilities they use (e.g., type of vehicle, load, etc.)
without destroying the presence of an exact potential. The \only" restriction is that those additional
parameters should not aect the local utility unless all players able to use the facility actually show
up. Games with structured utilities t here since each player uses the same list of facilities under every
strategy.
This generalization allowed us to include the constructions considered by Le Breton and Weber
(2011) and Harks et al. (2011) into the same general scheme. It seems quite possible that other
examples could be found as well, but, so far, I have been unable to produce anything specic.
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